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ABSTRACT
WaveCluster is an important family of grid-based clustering algo-
rithms that are capable of finding clusters of arbitrary shapes. In
this paper, we investigate techniques to perform WaveCluster while
ensuring differential privacy. Our goal is to develop a general tech-
nique for achieving differential privacy on WaveCluster that ac-
commodates different wavelet transforms. We show that straight-
forward techniques based on synthetic data generation and intro-
duction of random noise when quantizing the data, though gener-
ally preserving the distribution of data, often introduce too much
noise to preserve useful clusters. We then propose two optimized
techniques, PrivTHR and PrivTHREM , which can significantly re-
duce data distortion during two key steps of WaveCluster: the quan-
tization step and the significant grid identification step. We conduct
extensive experiments based on four datasets that are particularly
interesting in the context of clustering, and show that PrivTHR and
PrivTHREM achieve high utility when privacy budgets are properly
allocated.
1. INTRODUCTION
Clustering is an important class of data analysis that has been
extensively applied in a variety of fields, such as identifying dif-
ferent groups of customers in marketing and grouping homologous
gene sequences in biology research [21]. Clustering results allow
data analysts to gain valuable insights into data distribution when
it is challenging to make hypotheses on raw data. Among vari-
ous clustering techniques, a grid-based clustering algorithm called
WaveCluster [35, 36] is famous for detecting clusters of arbitrary
shapes. WaveCluster relies on wavelet transforms, a family of con-
volutions with appropriate kernel functions, to convert data into a
transformed space, where the natural clusters in the data become
more distinguishable.
In many data-analysis scenarios, when the data being analyzed
contains personal information and the result of the analysis needs to
be shared with the public or untrusted third parties, sensitive private
information may be leaked, e.g., whether certain personal informa-
tion is stored in a database or has contributed to the analysis. Con-
sider the databases A and B in Figure 1. These two databases have
two attributes, Monthly Income and Monthly Living Expenses, and
the records differ only in one record, u. Without u’s participation
in database A, WaveCluster identifies two separate clusters, marked
by blue and red, respectively. With u’s participation, WaveCluster
identifies only one cluster marked by color blue from database B.
Therefore, merely from the number of clusters returned (rather than
which data points belong to which cluster), an adversary may infer
a user’s participation. Due to such potential leak of private infor-
mation, data holders may be reluctant to share the original data or
data-analysis results with each other or with the public.
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Example of personal privacy breach in cluster analysis.
In this paper, we develop techniques to perform WaveCluster
with differential privacy [12, 14]. Differential privacy provides a
provable strong privacy guarantee that the output of a computation
is insensitive to any particular individual. In other words, based on
the output, an adversary has limited ability to make inference about
whether an individual is present or absent in the dataset. Differen-
tial privacy is often achieved by the perturbation of randomized al-
gorithms, and the privacy level is controlled by a parameter  called
“privacy budget”. Intuitively, the privacy protection via differential
privacy grows stronger as  grows smaller.
WaveCluster provides a framework that allows any kind of wavelet
transform to be plugged in for data transformation, such as the
Haar transform [4] and Biorthogonal transform [28]. There are
various wavelet transforms that are suitable for different types of
applications, such as image compression and signal processing [5].
Plugged in different wavelet transforms, WaveCluster can leverage
different properties of the data, such as frequency and location, for
finding the dense regions as clusters. Thus, in this paper, we aim
to develop a general technique for achieving differential privacy on
WaveCluster that accommodates different wavelet transforms.
We first consider a general technique, Baseline, that adapts exist-
ing differentially private data-publishing techniques to WaveClus-
ter through synthetic data generation. Specifically, we could gener-
ate synthetic data based on any data model of the original data that
is published through differential privacy, and then apply WaveClus-
ter using any wavelet transform over the synthetic data. Baseline
seems particularly promising as many effective differentially pri-
vate data-publishing techniques have been proposed in the litera-
ture, all of which strive to preserve some important properties of
the original data. Therefore, hopefully the “shape” of the original
data is also preserved in the synthetic data, and consequently could
be discovered by WaveCluster. Unfortunately, as we will show later
in the paper, this synthetic data-generation technique often can-
not produce accurate results. Differentially private data-publishing
techniques such as spatial decompositions [10], adaptive-grid [33],
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Figure 2: Inaccurate clustering result produced by Baseline. (a)
shows the WaveCluster results on the original data and (b) shows
the WaveCluster results of Baseline, which leverages the adaptive-
grid [33] approach to generate the synthetic data. Points in different
clusters are shown in different colors, and the points marked by red
are considered as noises that do not form a cluster.
and Privelet [39], output noisy descriptions of the data distribution
and often contain negative counts for sparse partitions due to ran-
dom noise. These negative counts do not affect the accuracy of
large range queries (which is often one of the main utility mea-
sures in private data publishing) since zero-mean noise distribution
smoothes the effect of negative counts. However, negative counts
cannot be smoothed away in the synthesized dataset, which are typ-
ically set to zero counts. Figure 2 shows an example of inaccurate
clustering results produced by Baseline using adaptive-grid [33],
As we can see, the synthetic data generated in Baseline significantly
distorts the data distribution, causing two clusters to be merged as
one and reducing the accuracy of the WaveCluster results.
Motivated by the above challenge, we propose three techniques
that enforce differential privacy on the key steps of WaveCluster,
rather than relying on synthetic data generation. WaveCluster ac-
cepts as input a set of data points in a multi-dimensional space,
and consists of the following main steps. First, in the quantiza-
tion step WaveCluster quantizes the multi-dimensional space by
dividing the space into grids, and computes the count of the data
points in each grid. These counts of grids form a count matrix
M . Second, in the wavelet transform step WaveCluster applies a
wavelet transform on the count matrix M to obtain the approxima-
tion of the multi-dimensional space. Third, in the significant grid
identification step WaveCluster identifies significant grids based on
the pre-defined density threshold. Fourth, in the cluster identifi-
cation step WaveCluster outputs as clusters the connected compo-
nents from these significant grids [23]. To enforce differential pri-
vacy on WaveCluster, we first propose a technique, PrivQT, that
introduces Laplacian noise to the quantization step. However, such
straightforward privacy enforcement cannot produce usable private
WaveCluster results, since the noise introduced in this step sig-
nificantly distorts the density threshold for identifying significant
grids. To address this issue, we further propose two techniques,
PrivTHR and PrivTHREM , which enforce differential privacy on
both the quantization step and the significant grid identification
step. These two techniques differ in how to determine the noisy
density threshold. We show that by allocating appropriate budgets
in these two steps, both techniques can achieve differential privacy
with significantly improved utility.
Traditionally, the effectiveness of WaveCluster is evaluated through
visual inspection by human experts (i.e., visually determining whether
the discovered clusters match those reflected in the user’s mind) [35,
36]. Unfortunately, visual inspection is inappropriate to assess the
utility of differentially private WaveCluster. Visual inspection is
not quantitative, and thus it is hard to systematically compare the
impact of different techniques through visual inspection. Gener-
ally, researchers use quantitative measures to assess the utility of
differentially private results, such as relative or absolute errors for
range queries and prediction accuracy for classification. But there
is no existing utility measures for density-based clustering algo-
rithms with differential privacy.
To mitigate this problem, in this paper we propose two types of
utility measures. The first is to measure the dissimilarity between
true and private WaveCluster results by measuring the differences
of significant grids and clusters, which correspond to the outputs of
the two key steps (the significant grid identification and the clus-
ter identification) in WaveCluster. To more intuitively understand
the usefulness of discovered clusters, our second utility measure
considers one concrete application of cluster analysis, i.e., to build
a classifier based on discovered clusters, and then use that clas-
sifier to predict future data. Therefore the prediction accuracy of
the classifier from one aspect reflects the actual utility of private
WaveCluster.
To evaluate the proposed techniques, our experiments use four
datasets containing different data shapes that are particularly in-
teresting in the context of clustering [1, 9]. Our results show that
PrivTHR and PrivTHREM achieve high utility for both types of util-
ity measures, and are superior to Baseline and PrivQT.
2. RELATED WORK
The syntactic approaches for privacy preserving clustering [18]
is to output k-anonymous clusters. Friedman et al. [17] presented
an algorithm to output k-anonymous clusters by using minimum
spanning tree. Karakasidis et al. [24] created k-anonymous clusters
by merging clusters so that each cluster contains at least k key val-
ues of the records. Fung et al. [19] proposed an approach that con-
verts the anonymity problem for cluster analysis to the counterpart
problem for classification analysis. Aggarwal et al. [3] proposed a
perturbation method called r-gather clustering, which releases the
cluster centers, together with their sizes, radiuses, and a set of as-
sociated sensitive values. However, these approaches only satisfy
syntactic privacy notions such as k-anonymity, and cannot provide
formal guarantees of privacy as differential privacy.
In this work, our goal is to perform WaveCluster under differen-
tial privacy. The focus of initial work on differential privacy [12–
15, 25] concerned the theoretical proof of its feasibility on various
data analysis tasks, e.g., histogram and logistic regression.
More recent work has focused on practical applications of differ-
ential privacy for privacy-preserving data publishing. An approach
proposed by Barak et al. [7] encoded marginals with Fourier co-
efficients and then added noise to the released coefficients. Hay
et al. [22] exploited consistency constraints to reduce noise for
histogram counts. Xiao et al. [39] proposed Privelet, which uses
wavelet transforms to reduce noise for histogram counts. Cormode
et al. [10] indexed data by kd-trees and quad-trees, developing ef-
fective budget allocation strategies for building the noisy trees and
obtaining noisy counts for the tree nodes. Qardaji et al. [33] pro-
posed uniform-grid and adaptive-grid methods to derive appropri-
ate partition granularity in differentially private synopsis publish-
ing. Xu et al. [40] proposed the NoiseFirst and StructureFirst tech-
niques for constructing optimal noisy histograms, using dynamic
programming and Exponential mechanism. These data publish-
ing techniques are specifically crafted for answering range queries.
Unfortunately, synthesizing the dataset and applying WaveCluster
on top of it often render WaveCluster results useless, since these
differentially private data publishing techniques do not capture the
essence of WaveCluster and introduce too much unnecessary noise
for WaveCluster.
Another important line of prior work focuses on integrating dif-
ferential privacy into other practical data analysis tasks, such as
regression analysis, model fitting, classification and etc. Chaud-
huri et al. [8] proposed a differentially private regularized logistic
regression algorithm that balances privacy with learnability. Zhang
et al. [42] proposed a differentially private approach for logistic and
linear regressions that involve perturbing the objective function of
the regression model, rather than simply introducing noise into the
results. Friedman et al. [16] incorporated differential privacy into
several types of decision trees and subsequently demonstrated the
tradeoff among privacy, accuracy and sample size. Using decision
trees as an example application, Mohammed et al. [31] investigated
a generalization-based algorithm for achieving differential privacy
for classification problems.
Differentially private cluster analysis has also be studied in prior
work. Zhang et al. [41] proposed differentially private model fitting
based on genetic algorithms, with applications to k-means cluster-
ing. McSherry [29] introduced the PINQ framework, which has
been applied to achieve differential privacy for k-means clustering
using an iterative algorithm [38]. Nissim et al. [32] proposed the
sample-aggregate framework that calibrates the noise magnitude
according to the smooth sensitivity of a function. They showed that
their framework can be applied to k-means clustering under the as-
sumption that the dataset is well-separated. These research efforts
primarily focus on centroid-based clustering, such as k-means, that
is most suited for separating convex clusters and presents insuffi-
cient spatial information to detect clusters with complex shapes,
e.g. concave shapes. In contrast to these research efforts, we pro-
pose techniques that enforce differential privacy on WaveCluster,
which is not restricted to well-separated datasets, and can detect
clusters with arbitrary shapes.
3. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the background of differential
privacy. Then we describe the WaveCluster algorithm followed by
our problem statement.
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy [12] is a recent privacy model, which guar-
antees that an adversary cannot infer an individual’s presence in a
dataset from the randomized output, despite having knowledge of
all remaining individuals in the dataset.
DEFINITION 1. (-differential privacy): Given any pair of neigh-
boring databasesD andD′ that differ only in one individual record,
a randomized algorithmA is -differentially private iff for any S ⊆
Range(A):
Pr[A(D) ∈ S] ≤ Pr[A(D′) ∈ S] ∗ e
The parameter  indicates the level of privacy. Smaller  provides
stronger privacy. When  is very small, e ≈ 1+ . Since the value
of  directly affects the level of privacy, we refer to it as the privacy
budget. Appropriate allocation of the privacy budget for a com-
putational process is important for reaching a favorable trade-off
between privacy and utility. The most common strategy to achieve
-differential privacy is to add noise to the output of a function. The
magnitude of introduced noise is calibrated by the privacy budget 
and the sensitivity of the query function. The sensitivity of a query
function is defined as the maximum difference between the outputs
of the query function on any pair of neighboring databases.:
∆f = max
D,D′
‖ f(D)− f(D′) ‖1
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Figure 3: Illustration of WaveCluster.
There are two common approaches for achieving -differential
privacy: Laplace mechanism [14] and Exponential mechanism [30].
Laplace Mechanism: The output of a query function f is per-
turbed by adding noise from the Laplace distribution with proba-
bility density function f(x|b) = 1
2b
exp(− |x|
b
), b = ∆f

. The fol-
lowing randomized mechanism Al satisfies -differential privacy:
Al(D) = f(D) + Lap(∆f

)
Exponential Mechanism: This mechanism returns an output
that is close to the optimum, with respect to a quality function.
A quality function q(D, r) assigns a score to all possible outputs
r ∈ R, where R is the output range of f , and better outputs receive
higher scores. A randomized mechanism Ae that outputs r ∈ R
with probability
Pr[Ae(D) = r] ∝ exp( q(D, r)
2S(q)
)
satisfies -differential privacy, where S(q) is the sensitivity of the
quality function.
Differential privacy has two properties: sequential composition
and parallel composition. Sequential composition is that given n
independent randomized mechanisms A1, A2, . . . , An where Ai
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies i-differential privacy, a sequence of Ai over
the dataset D satisfies -differential privacy, where  =
∑n
1 (i).
Parallel composition is that given n independent randomized mech-
anismsA1, A2, . . . , An whereAi (1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies -differential
privacy, a sequence ofAi over a set of disjoint data setsDi satisfies
-differential privacy.
3.2 WaveCluster
WaveCluster is an algorithm developed by Sheikholeslami et al. [35,
36] for the purpose of clustering spatial data. It works by using
a wavelet transform to detect the boundaries between clusters. A
wavelet transform allows the algorithm to distinguish between ar-
eas of high contrast (high frequency components) and areas of low
contrast (low frequency components). The motivation behind this
distinction is that within a cluster there should be low contrast and
between clusters there should be an area of high contrast (the bor-
der). WaveCluster has the following steps as shown in Figure 3:
Quantization: Quantize the feature space into grids of a speci-
fied size, creating a count matrix M .
Wavelet Transform: Apply a wavelet transform to the count
matrixM , such as Haar transform [4] and Biorthogonal transform [28],
and decompose M to the average subband that gives the approxi-
mation of the count matrix and the detail subband that has the in-
formation about the boundaries of clusters. We refer to the average
subband as the wavelet-transformed-value matrix (W ).
Significant Grid Identification: Identify the significant grids
from the average subband W . WaveCluster constructs a sorted list
L of the positive wavelet transformed values obtained from W and
compute the pth percentile of the values in L. The values that are
below the pth percentile of L are non-significant values. Their cor-
responding grids are considered as non-significant grids and the
data points in the non-significant grids are considered as noise.
Cluster Identification: Identify clusters from the significant grids
using connected component labeling algorithm [23] (two grids are
connected if they are adjacent), map the clusters back to the orig-
inal multi-dimensional space, and label the data points based on
which cluster the data points reside in.
In WaveCluster, users need to specify four parameters:
num_grid (g1, g2, . . . , gn): the number of grids that the n-
dimensional space is partitioned into along each dimension. For the
brevity of description, we simply use g to refer to the partitions of
the n-dimensional space (g1, g2, . . . , gn). This parameter controls
the scaling of quantization. Inappropriate scaling can cause prob-
lems of over-quantization and under-quantization, affecting the ac-
curacy of clustering [36].
density threshold (p): a percentage value p that specifies p% of
the values in L are non-significant values. For ease of presentation,
we use k = (1− p)|L| to represent the top k values in L and their
corresponding grids are considered as significant grids.
level: a wavelet decomposition level, which indicates how many
times a wavelet transform is applied. The larger the level is, the
more approximate the result is. In our techniques, we set level to 1
since a smaller level value provides more accurate results [36].
wavelet: a wavelet transform to be applied. Haar transform [4]
is one of the simplest wavelet transforms and widely used, which
is computed by iterating difference and averaging between odd and
even samples of a signal (or a sequence of data points). Other com-
monly used wavelet transforms include Biorthogonal transform [28],
Daubechies transform [11], and so on.
Motivating Scenario. Consider a scenario with two partici-
pants: the data owner (e.g. hospitals) and the querier (e.g. data
miner). The data owner holds raw data and has the legal obliga-
tion to protect individuals’ privacy while the querier is eager to
obtain cluster analysis results for further exploration. The goal of
our work is to enable the data owner to release cluster analysis re-
sults using WaveCluster while not compromising the privacy of any
individual who contributes to the raw data. The data owner has a
good knowledge of the raw data and it is not difficult for her to pick
the appropriate parameters (e.g. num_grid, density threshold, and
wavelet) for non-private WaveCluster. For example, the data owner
may draw from her past experience on similar data to determine
the appropriate parameters for the current dataset. The parameters
picked for the non-private setting are directly used for the private
setting, and thus the data owner does not need to infer another set
of parameters for the private setting.
Problem Statement. Given a raw data setD, appropriate WaveClus-
ter parameters for D and a privacy budget , our goal is to investi-
gate an effective approach A such that A (1) satisfies -differential
privacy, and (2) achieves high utility of the private WaveCluster
results with regard to the utility metrics U .
4. APPROACHES
In this section, we present four techniques for achieving differ-
ential privacy on WaveCluster. We first describe the Baseline tech-
nique that achieves differential privacy through synthetic data gen-
eration. We then describe three techniques that enforces differential
privacy on the key steps of WaveCluster.
4.1 Baseline Approach (Baseline)
A straightforward technique to achieve differential privacy on
WaveCluster is as follows: (1) adapt an existing -differential pri-
vacy preserving data publishing method to get the noisy description
of the data distribution in some fashion, such as a set of contingency
tables or a spatial decomposition tree [10, 33, 39, 40]; (2) generate
a synthetic dataset according to the noisy description; (3) apply
WaveCluster on the synthetic dataset. We refer to this technique as
Baseline, and its pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Baseline
Input: Dataset D, num_grid g, density threshold p, wavelet trans-
form w, differential privacy budget 
Output: A set of differentially private clusters
1: procedure Baseline(D, g, p, w, )
2: D′ = DiffPrivPublishing(D, )
3: M ′ = Quantization(D′, g)
4: W ′ = WaveletTransform(M ′,w)
5: L′ = ConvertToPosSortedArray(W ′)
6: k′ = (1− p)|L′|
7: d′ = Top(k′,L′)
8: return ConnCompLabel(W ′, d′)
9: end procedure
Baseline first leverages a -differential privacy preserving data
publishing method to obtain a noisy dataset D′ (Line 2) and parti-
tions D′ based on the number of grids g to obtain the noisy count
matrix M ′ (Line 3). Baseline then applies a wavelet transform on
M ′ to obtain W ′ (Line 4). W ′ is then turned into a list L′ that
keeps only positive values and the values in L′ is sorted in ascend-
ing order (Line 5). With L′, k′ is computed based on the specified
density threshold p and the size of L′ (Line 6). Finally, Baseline
obtains d′ as the top k′th value in L′ (Line 7), where any value in
L′ greater than d′ is considered as a significant value, and applies
the connected component labeling algorithm to identify clusters of
significant grids (Line 8).
Discussion. Baseline achieves differential privacy on WaveClus-
ter through the achievement of differential privacy on data publish-
ing. However, it does not produce accurate WaveCluster results in
most cases. The adapted -differential privacy preserving data pub-
lishing method is designed for answering range queries. The noisy
descriptions of the data distribution generated by the method may
contain negative counts for certain partitions since the noise distri-
bution is Laplacian with zero mean. These negative counts do not
affect the range query accuracy too much since zero-mean noise
distribution smooths the effect of noise. For example, a partition
p1 has the true count of 2 and the noisy count of -2, whose noise
is canceled by another partition p2 having the true count of 10 and
the noisy count of 14 when both p1 and p2 are included in a range
query. In particular, when the range query spreads large range of a
dataset, a single partition with a noisy negative count does not af-
fect its accuracy too much. However, when the method is used for
generating a synthetic dataset, the noisy negative counts are reset as
zero counts, causing the data distribution to change radically on the
whole and further leading to the severe deviation in differentially
private WaveCluster results.
4.2 Private Quantization (PrivQT)
To address the challenge faced by Baseline, we propose tech-
niques that enforce differential privacy on the key steps of WaveClus-
ter. Our first approach, called Private Quantization (PrivQT), in-
troduces independent Laplacian noise in the quantization step to
achieve differential privacy. In the quantization step, the data is di-
vided into grids and the count matrix M is computed. To ensure
differential privacy in this step, we rely on the Laplace mechanism
that introduces independent Laplacian noise to M . Clearly, if we
change one individual in the input data, such as adding, removing
or modifying an individual, there is at most one change in one entry
of M . According to the parallel composition property of differen-
tial privacy, the noise amount introduced to each grid is Lap( 1

),
given a privacy budget . Since the following steps of WaveCluster
are carried on using the differentially private count matrix M ′, the
clusters derived from these steps are also differentially private. Al-
gorithm 2 shows the pseudocode of PrivQT. Except from the first
step that introduces independent Laplacian noise toM (Line 2), the
other steps (Lines 3-7) are the same as Baseline.
Algorithm 2 PrivQT
Input: Dataset D, num_grid g, density threshold p, wavelet trans-
form w, differential privacy budget 
Output: A set of differentially private clusters
1: procedure PrivQT (D, g, p, w, )
2: M ′ = PrivQuantization(D, g, )
3: W ′ = WaveletTransform(M ′,w)
4: L′ = ConvertToPosSortedArray(W ′)
5: k′ = (1− p)|L′|
6: d′ = Top(k′,L′)
7: return ConnCompLabel(W ′, d′)
8: end procedure
Selecting the appropriate grid size (reflected by the parameter
num_grid g) in the quantization step strongly affects the accuracy
of WaveCluster results [36], and also the differentially private
WaveCluster results. A small grid size (small g) causes more data
points to fall into each grid and thus the count of data points for
each grid becomes larger, which makes the count matrix M resis-
tant to Laplacian noise. However, the small grid size is not helpful
for WaveCluster to detect clusters with accurate shapes and ren-
ders the results less useful. On the other hand, although posing a
larger grid size on the data captures the density distribution of the
data more clearly, it makes each grid’s count too small and thus be-
come sensitive to Laplacian noise, which dramatically affects the
identification of significant grids and further the shapes of clusters.
Our empirical results show that only when an appropriate grid size
is given, differentially private WaveCluster results maintains high
utility.
Discussion. Although PrivQT achieves differential privacy on
the WaveCluster results, the noisy count matrixM ′ and its resulting
noisy L′ are significantly distorted and consequently the clustering
results. The reason is as follows. Given a specified percentage
value p, PrivQT computes k′ from the positive values in W ′, where
W ′ is derived from M ′, which is perturbed by Laplacian noise.
Laplacian distribution is symmetric and has zero-mean. According
to its randomness, approximately half of the zero-count grids be-
come noisy positive-count grids due to positive noise while the re-
maining ones are turned into noisy negative-count grids due to neg-
ative noise. These noisy positive-count grids may cause their cor-
responding wavelet transformed values in W ′ to become positive
(depending on the targeted wavelet transform), which will inappro-
priately participate in the computation of k′ and further distorts k′.
Due to the dominating errors introduced by approximately half of
zero-count grids becoming noisy positive-count grids, our empir-
ical results show that the utility of private WaveCluster results by
PrivQT improves marginally even for a large privacy budget.
4.3 Private Quantization with Refined Noisy
Density Threshold (PrivTHR)
The limitation of PrivQT lies in the severe distortion of k′ by
Laplacian noise introduced into count matrix M ′. To mitigate the
distortion, we propose a technique, PrivTHR, which prunes a por-
tion of noisy positive values in W ′ to refine the computation of k′.
Algorithm 3 shows the pseudocode of PrivTHR.
PrivTHR first introduces random noise to the count matrix M ,
similar to PrivQT, and obtains a noisy count matrix M ′ (Line 2).
PrivTHR then applies a wavelet transform on M ′ to obtain W ′
(Line 3). W ′ is then turned into a list L′ that keeps only posi-
tive values and the values in L′ is sorted in ascending order (Line
4). Thus, only the positive values inW ′ will be used for computing
k′ based on the specified density threshold p. To reduce the distor-
tion of k′, starting from the smallest noisy positive values in L′,
PrivTHR discards the first |Z|
′
2
values (Line 6), where Z represents
the non-positive (negative or zero) values in the W and |Z|′ is a
noisy estimate of |Z| (Line 5). The reason why PrivTHR removes
|Z|′
2
values from L′ is based on the utility analysis (in Section 5.2)
that approximately |Z|
2
non-positive values in W are turned into
positive values due to the randomness of Laplacian noise. Since
|Z| partially describes the data distribution and releasing |Z| with-
out protection may leak private information, PrivTHR also intro-
duces Laplacian noise to |Z|, ensuring the whole process correctly
enforces differentially privacy (Lines 11-17). The noise introduced
to |Z| depends on the wavelet transform used to compute W . For
example, if we use Haar transform for n-dimensional data, a value
in W is computed by applying average for two neighboring ele-
ments along each dimension. Since any single change in the input
only causes one entry of the count matrix M to change by 1, the
change of M causes at maximum one value in W to change, and
thus causes |Z| to change by 1 at maximum, i.e., the sensitivity of
|Z| is 11. Finally, PrivTHR obtains d′ as the top k′th value in L′′
(Line 8), where any value in L′′ greater than d′ is considered as
a significant value, and applies the connected component labeling
algorithm to identify clusters of significant grids (Line 9).
Budget Allocation. PrivTHR first introduces Laplacian noise
in the quantization step using a privacy budget 1 = α, where
0 < α < 1. In the significant grid identification step, PrivTHR
further introduces Laplacian noise to |Z| using the remaining pri-
vacy budget (1−α). Based on utility analysis in Section 5.2.2, 1
requires a smaller amount of budget than 2. Our empirical results
in Section 7 further show in detail the impact of α on clustering
accuracy.
4.4 Private Quantization with Noisy Thresh-
old using Exponential Mechanism (PrivTHREM)
Besides pruning noisy positive values in W ′, we propose an al-
ternative technique that employs Exponential mechanism for deriv-
ing k′ from the sorted list of L. Algorithm 4 shows the pseudocode
of PrivTHREM .
PrivTHREM first introduces Laplacian noise to the count matrix
M , which is similar to PrivQT and PrivTHR. After that, we obtain a
noisy count matrixM ′ (Line 2) and the correspondingW ′ (Line 3).
Different from the previous two techniques that compute k′ from
1For other wavelet transforms that use circular convolutions, such
as Biorthogonal transform, the sensitivity of n depends on the count
of positive values and the count of negative values in the matrix
computed by the coefficient vector [28].
Algorithm 3 PrivTHR
Input: Dataset D, num_grid g, density threshold p, wavelet trans-
form w, differential privacy budget , allocation percentage α
Output: A set of differentially private clusters
1: procedure PrivTHR(D, g, p, w, , α)
2: M ′ = PrivQuantization(D, g, α)
3: W ′ = WaveletTransform(M ′,w)
4: L′ = ConvertToPosSortedArray(W ′)
5: |Z|′ = NOISYCOUNTOFNONPOSVALUES(D, g,w, (1 −
α))
6: L′′ = RemoveFrom(L′,0, |Z|
′
2
)
7: k′ = (1− p)|L′′|
8: d′ = Top(k′,L′′)
9: return ConnCompLabel(W ′, d′)
10: end procedure
11: procedure NOISYCOUNTOFNONPOSVALUES(D, g,w, )
12: M = Quantization(D, g)
13: W = WaveletTransform(M ,w)
14: |Z| = CountOfNonPos(W )
15: |Z|′ = |Z| + Lap(Sensitivity(n)

)
16: return |Z|′
17: end procedure
W ′, PrivTHREM derives k′ fromW using Exponential mechanism
(Lines 7-15). In this case, although the sorted list derived from
W ′ is severely distorted in PrivTHREM , the derivation of k′ from
W is not affected by the distorted W ′ at all. Given reasonable
privacy budget, k′ derived from W using Exponential mechanism
is reasonably accurate, compared to the case when k′ is derived
from W ′.
The quality function fed into the Exponential mechanism is [10]:
q(L,X) = −|rank(x)− k|,
where L represents the sorted positive values in W with Min and
Max values (Line 10), andX represents the possible output space,
i.e., all the possible values in the range of (0,Max]. Given a W
withm positive values and their relationships are x1 ≥ x2 ≥ . . . ≥
xm, these m values divide the range (0,Max] into m partitions:
(0, xm], (xm−1, xm−2], . . . , (x2, x1], and the ranks for these par-
titions are m, m − 1, . . ., 2, 1. For any x ∈ (xi−1, xi], its rank is
rank(xi). For example, if x ∈ (x2, x1], rank(x) = rank(x1) =
1. Similar to PrivTHR, when using Haar transform, any single
change in the input causes only one value in W to change. Thus, at
maximum one value will be added into or removed from L, causing
the outcome of q(L,X) to be changed by 1, i.e., the sensitivity of
q(L,X) is 12.
Plugging in the above quality function into Exponential mecha-
nism, we obtain the following algorithm: for any value x ∈ (0,Max],
the Exponential mechanism (EM) returns x with probability
Pr[EM(L) = x] ∝ exp(− |rank(x)−k|
2
) (Line 12). Since all the
values in a partition have the same probability to be chosen, a ran-
dom value from the partition Pti = (xi−1, xi] will be chosen with
the probability proportional to |Pti| ∗ exp(− 2 |i − k|). In other
words, once k′ is chosen, PrivTHREM further computes a uniform
random value d′ from Pti (Line 13), and any value in L′ greater
than d′ is considered as a significant value.
Budget Allocation. Similar to PrivTHR, the privacy budget is
2Similar to PrivTHR, for other wavelet transforms that use circu-
lar convolutions, the sensitivity of q(L,X) depends on the count
of positive values and the count of negative values in the matrix
computed by the coefficient vector [28].
split between two steps: introduction of Laplacian noise in quan-
tization and obtaining k′ using Exponential mechanism. Previous
empirical experiments [10] on splitting budgets between obtaining
noisy median and noisy counts suggest that, 30% vs. 70% bud-
get allocation strategy performs best. Specifically, 70% of budget
is allocated for obtaining noisy count matrix M ′ (Line 2) and the
remaining budget is allocated for computing k′ (Line 4).
Algorithm 4 PrivTHREM
Input: Dataset D, num_grid g, density threshold p, wavelet trans-
form w, differential privacy budget , allocation percentage α
Output: A set of differentially private clusters
1: procedure PrivTHREM (D, g, p, w, , α)
2: M ′ = PrivQuantization(D, g, α)
3: W ′ = WaveletTransform(M ′,w)
4: d′ = NOISYDENSITYTHRESHOLD(D, g, p, w, (1− α))
5: return ConnCompLabel(W ′, d′)
6: end procedure
7: procedure NOISYDENSITYTHRESHOLD(D, g, p, w, )
8: M = Quantization(D, g)
9: W = WaveletTransform(M ,w)
10: L = ConvertToPosSortedArray(W )
11: k = (1− p)|L|
12: k′ = ExponentialMechanism(L,k,)
13: d′ = UniformRandom(L, k′ )
14: return d′
15: end procedure
5. PRIVACY AND UTILITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the theoretical analysis of proposed
techniques PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHREM .
5.1 Privacy Analysis
In this part we establish the privacy guarantee of PrivQT, PrivTHR
and PrivTHREM .
THEOREM 1. PrivQT is -differentially private.
PROOF. PrivQT introduces independent Laplacian noiseLap( 1

)
to grid counts, which are computed on disjoint datasets. Accord-
ing to the parallel composition property of differential privacy de-
scribed in Section 3.1, the privacy cost depends only on the worst
guarantee of all computations over disjoint datasets. Therefore,
PrivQT is -differentially private.
THEOREM 2. PrivTHR is -differentially private.
PROOF. PrivTHR splits privacy budget into two parts. First,
for private quantization, adding Laplacian noise Lap( 1
α
) achieves
strict α-differential privacy. The proof is same as PrivQT. Second,
PrivTHR introduces Laplacian noise Lap( 1
(1−α) ) to the true count
of non-positive values in W , which achieves (1 − α)-differential
privacy. Using the composition property of differential privacy,
PrivTHR achieves -differentially private since  = α + (1 −
α).
THEOREM 3. PrivTHREM is -differentially private.
PROOF. Similar to PrivTHR, PrivTHREM has two steps of ran-
domization: private quantization and obtaining noisy density thresh-
old d′. Private quantization achieves α-differential privacy ac-
cording to Laplace mechanism and parallel composition property.
Sampling noisy density threshold d′ by Exponential mechanism
consumes budget of (1−α), which achieves (1−α)-differential
privacy. According to the composition property of differential pri-
vacy, PrivTHREM is -differentially private.
5.2 Utility Analysis
In this section, we present utility guarantees of our algorithms
(PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHREM ) with theoretical analysis. In
WaveCluster, the step of significant grid identification determines
the clustering results. In the private results of WaveCluster, PrivQT,
PrivTHR and PrivTHREM return a list of noisy significant grids. To
quantify the utility of PrivQT, PrivTHR and PrivTHREM , we con-
sider finding significant grids whose wavelet transformed values
surpass a threshold to be similar to finding the top-k frequent item-
sets whose frequencies surpass a threshold. In significant grid iden-
tification, L is the list of positive wavelet transformed values from
W sorted in ascending order, Z represents the set of zero values
fromW , and k indicates the threshold position in L and all the top-
k values inL correspond to significant grids, where k = (1−p)|L|.
One parameter to specify k is the density threshold p, which re-
mains the same either with or without noise introduction. How-
ever, |L|, another parameter to determine k, will be changed to |L′|
under differential privacy, where L′ is the list of positive wavelet
transformed values from W ′ sorted in ascending order. L is dif-
ferent from L′ since noise introduction might result in a portion of
zero values in Z becoming positive and a small portion of positive
values in L becoming non-positive.
5.2.1 Utility Analysis for PrivQT.
We first provide the analysis of difference between k and k′ in
PrivQT. In PrivQT, the difference between k′ and k depends on two
factors: (1) a set of zero values in Z becoming noisy positive,
Z′p = {W ′Z |W ′Z = WZ + Noise,WZ ∈ Z,W ′Z > 0}, where
W ′Z is the noisy value of zero value in Z, and (2) a set of posi-
tive values in L becoming noisy non-positive, L′n = {W ′L|W ′L =
WL + Noise,WL ∈ L,W ′L ≤ 0}, where W ′L is the noisy value
of positive value in L. That is, k′ = (1− p)(|L|+ |Z′p| − |L′n|).
Analysis of |Z′p|. In PrivQT, since we are adding Lap( 1 ) noise
to each grid count and the Haar transform computes the average
from four adjacent grids, the noise added into a wavelet trans-
formed value is the sum of four i.i.d. samples from the Laplace
distribution. The sum of h i.i.d. Laplace distributions with mean
0 is the difference of two i.i.d. Gamma distributions [26], referred
to as distribution T . Distribution T is a polynomial in |x| divided
by e|x|, which is a symmetric function and thus the probability for
distribution T to produce positive values is 1
2
. Thus, the events
of values in Z adding positive noise from distribution T conform
to the Binominal Distribution with parameters |Z| and 1
2
and its
expected value is |Z|
2
.
Analysis of |L′n|. For L′n, each value is added the noise con-
forming to the symmetric distribution T . The probability density
function of |L′n| is f|L′n|(x) =
(|L|
x
)∏x
i=1 fT (y ≤ −Wi)
∏|L|
i=x+1
fT (y > −Wi),Wi ∈ L, and its expected value E[|L′n|] is
∑|L|
n=1
fT (y ≤ −Wi). E[|L′n|] is large when Wi is small and there is
limited privacy budget. Consider an extreme case that might not be
suitable for clustering. All the positive values in L are the mini-
mum value 0.5 due to the sum of adjacent four grid counts being
the minimum value 1, resulting in a highE[|L′n|]. Clustering, espe-
cially WaveCluster algorithm, is useful when the dataset has dense
areas (clusters) and empty areas (gap between clusters). Such ex-
treme case is not suitable for clustering since its data distribution is
close to uniform distribution. Those datasets that are interesting for
clustering always have highly dense cluster centers and cluster bor-
ders with low density. Only those values corresponding to border
grids are possible to become noisy non-positive and the size of bor-
der grids is relatively small. Therefore,E[|L′n|] is a small constant.
We refer to the value of |L′n| as θ in the following analysis.
Analysis of k′ − k. In PrivQT, E[k′ − k] = (1 − p)( |Z|
2
− θ).
There are two extreme cases when k′ − k ≈ 0. For one extreme,
|Z| = |L| and all the positive values in L is the minimum value
0.5. When  = 1, θ ≈ 0.43|L| ≈ |Z|
2
, which makes k′ − k ≈ 0.
For another extreme, |Z| = 0, all the positive values in L is large,
e.g. ≥ 15. When  = 1, θ ≈ 0 and k′ − k ≈ 0. For those datasets
that are interesting in the context of clustering, |Z| is pretty large
compared to the whole space since Z is used to separate different
clusters. What is more, dense areas within clusters are typically
larger than the space of cluster borders with low density, i.e. θ
is far smaller than |Z|
2
. In PrivQT, |Z|
2
dominates the difference
between k′−k, which increases false positive rate. In PrivTHR and
PrivTHREM , we use different strategies to minimize the difference
between k′ − k.
THEOREM 4. In PrivQT with Haar transform, given 0 < ω <
1, let η1 = |Z|2 −
√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
, η2 = |Z|2 +
√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
, and γ =
8

ln ( 4(|L|+|Z|)
ω
), then with probability at least (1 − ω)2, (1) all
values in L greater than Wk′min + γ are output, where k
′
min =
k + (1− p)(η1 − θ), and (2) no values in L less than Wk′max − γ
are output, where k′max = k + (1− p)(η2 − θ).
PROOF. In PrivQT, k′ = (1−p)(|L|+ |Z′p|−|L′n|). Since |Z′p|
follows Binominal distribution with parameters |Z| and 1
2
and |L′n|
is noted as a small value θ, k′ follows the Binomial distribution and
decides the number of values in L that become output. Given ω,
we can derive k′’s lower bound k′min, and show that values greater
thanWk′min+γ are output, i.e., subclaim (1). Let 1−ω = Pr(k
′ ≥
k′min) = Pr(|Z′p| ≥ η1). As Pr(|Z′p| ≥ η1) = 1 - Pr(|Z′p| ≤ η1)
and Pr(|Z′p| ≤ η1) ≤ e(−2
(
|Z|
2
−η1)2
|Z| ) [6], we have η1 = |Z|2 −√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
. For constant ω, η1 = O( |Z|2 −
√
|Z|
2
) will suffice.
Similar as k′min, we can also derive the bound γ of the noise
added to each value in L ∪ Z based on ω. For Haar wavelet trans-
form, each value in L ∪ Z is added the noise that is the sum of
4 Laplacian random variables divided by 2 (i.e., 4Lap(
1

)
2
). For
values in L ∪ Z, let all 4(|L| + |Z|) Laplacian random variables
generate noise within [− γ
4
, γ
4
]. The probability that no Laplacian
random variable’ value is outside [− γ
4
, γ
4
] is 1 − Pr(A), where
A is that at least one Laplacian random variable’s value is out-
side [− γ
4
, γ
4
]. By union bound, Pr(A) ≤ ∑4(|L|+|Z|)i=1 Pr(Bi),
where Bi is that ith Laplacian random variable’s noise is outside
[− γ
4
, γ
4
] and Pr(Bi) = e−
γ
8 . Thus, we can derive that with at
least the probability 1 − 4(|L| + |Z|)e− γ8 , no Laplacian random
variable’ value is outside [− γ
4
, γ
4
], and each value in L ∪ Z has
their noise amount within [− γ
2
, γ
2
]. Let ω = 4(|L| + |Z|)e− γ8 ,
then − γ
8
= ln ( ω
4(|L|+|Z|) ) and we have γ =
8

ln ( 4(|L|+|Z|)
ω
).
For constant ω, γ = O( ln(4(|L|+|Z|))

).
Subclaim (1) can be derived based on (a) with probability at least
1−ω, k′ ≥ k′min and (b) with probability at least 1−ω, the noise
of each value in L being within [− γ
2
, γ
2
]. Detailed proof is omitted
here. Subclaim (1) requires both conditions (a) and (b) to hold, and
thus the probability is at least (1− ω)2.
We can derive the upper bound k′max of k′ given ω. Let 1−ω =
Pr(k′ ≤ k′max) = Pr(|Z′p| ≤ η2). Recall that |Z′p| follows
Binomial distribution (|Z|, 1
2
), and Binomial distribution (|Z|, 1
2
)
is symmetric with respect to |Z|
2
. Thus, the probability of sam-
pling a value from the range [0, η2] is the same as sampling a
value from the range [η1, |Z|], and we have η2 = |Z| − η1 =
|Z|
2
+
√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
. For constant ω, η2 = O( |Z|2 +
√
|Z|
2
) will
suffice.
Subclaim (2) can be proved based on (c) with probability at least
1 − ω, k′ ≤ k′max and (b) with probability at least 1 − ω, the
noise of each value in L being within [− γ
2
, γ
2
]. As subclaim (2)
requires both conditions (c) and (b) to hold, the probability is at
least (1− ω)2.
For other wavelet transforms that use circular convolutions, such as
Biorthogonal transform, the derivation for the bounds of k′ with η1
and η2 remains the same since |Z′p| following Binomial distribu-
tion is independent of any wavelet transform being adapted. Thus,
our framework is extensible to other wavelet transforms, and the
bound of noise magnitude γ depends on the amount of adjacent
grid counts involved in computing a wavelet transformed value.
5.2.2 Utility Analysis for PrivTHR.
THEOREM 5. In PrivTHR with Haar transform, given 0 < ω <
1, let η1 = |Z|2 −
√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
, η2 = |Z|2 +
√
|Z| ln ( 1
ω
)
2
, γ =
8
1
ln ( 4(|L|+|Z|)
ω
) and β = 2
2
ln ( 1
ω
), then with probability at least
(1 − ω)3, (1) all values in L greater than Wk′min + γ are output,
where k′min = k + (1− p)(η1 − θ − |Z|2 − β), and (2) no values
in L less than Wk′max − γ are output, where k′max = k + (1 −
p)(η2 − θ − |Z|2 + β).
PROOF. In PrivTHR, we allocate 1 for private quantization and
2 for protecting |Z|2 , which makes k
′ = (1− p)(|L|+ |Z′p| − θ−
|Z|
2
+Lap( 1
2
)). With the probability at least 1− e− 2β2 , Lap( 1
2
)
has the noise amount within β. Let 1 − ω = 1 − e− 2β2 , then
we get β = 2
2
ln ( 1
ω
). For constant ω, β = O( 1
2
) will suffice.
The proofs of η1, η2, γ and subclaims (1) and (2) are the same as
THEOREM 4, and γ = O( ln(4(|L|+|Z|))
1
) for constant ω.
Difference between PrivTHR and PrivQT: By THEOREM 4, in
PrivQT k′min = k + (1 − p)(η1 − θ) and k′max = k + (1 −
p)(η2−θ). By THEOREM 5, in PrivTHR k′min = k+(1−p)(η1−
θ − |Z|
2
− β) and k′max = k + (1 − p)(η2 − θ − |Z|2 + β).
η1 = O(
|Z|
2
−
√
|Z|
2
), η2 = O( |Z|2 +
√
|Z|
2
). As we can see, by
removing |Z|
2
±β positive values from L′, PrivTHR provides better
utility guarantee than PrivQT since the difference between k′ and k
becomes O(
√
|Z|
2
)± (β+ θ), where θ is a small constant and β is
small when sufficient budget 2 is provided.
5.2.3 Utility Analysis for PrivTHREM .
THEOREM 6. In PrivTHREM with Haar transform, given 0 <
ω < 1, let η1 = |L| − k− 1 + 22 ln(
|Wmax−Wk|
|Wk|ω ), η2 = k− 2 +
2
2
ln( |Wk||Wmax−Wk|ω ), and γ =
8
1
ln ( 4(|L|+|Z|)
ω
), then with prob-
ability at least (1−ω)2, (1) all values in L greater thanWk′min+γ
are output, where k′min = k− η1, and (2) no values in L less than
Wk′max − γ are output, where k′max = k + η2.
PROOF. In PrivTHREM , we allocate 2 for deriving k′ from k
by employing Exponential mechanism, a general method proposed
in [30]. The probability of selecting a rank i is |Pti|∗exp(− 22 |i−
rank(Wk)|), where Pti is the range (Wi−1,Wi] decided by the
i− 1th and ith wavelet transformed values.
Let 1−ω be the probability of sampling a k′ where k−k′ ≤ η1,
then
⇔ ω < |Wmax −Wk| ∗ e
− 2
2
(η1+1)
|Wk| ∗ e−
2
2
(|L|−k)
⇔ η1 < |L| − k − 1 + 2
2
ln(
|Wmax −Wk|
|Wk|ω )
For constant ω, η1 = O(|L|−k+ 12 ln(
|Wmax−Wk|
|Wk| ) will suffice.
Let 1−ω be the probability of sampling a k′ where k′−k ≤ η2,
then
⇔ ω < |Wk| ∗ e
− 2
2
(η2+1)
|Wmax −Wk| ∗ e−
2
2
(k−1)
⇔ η2 < k − 2 + 2
2
ln(
|Wk|
|Wmax −Wk|ω )
For constant ω, η2 = O(k + 12 ln(
|Wk|
|Wmax−Wk| ) will suffice. The
proof of γ and subclaims (1) and (2) are the same as THEOREM
4.
Analysis of PrivTHR and PrivTHREM . By THEOREM 5 and
THEOREM 6, the accuracy for sampling k′ in PrivTHR is domi-
nated by 1
2
while in PrivTHREM the accuracy is dominated by
1
2
ln( |Wk||Wmax−Wk| ). Depending on the data distribution, PrivTHREM
may present better or worse utility guarantee than PrivTHR:
ln( |Wk||Wmax−Wk| ) is positive when when
|Wk|
|Wmax−Wk| > 1, and
the accuracy for sampling k′ in PrivTHREM becomes more sen-
sitive to 2 than PrivTHR; ln( |Wk||Wmax−Wk| ) becomes negative when
|Wk|
|Wmax−Wk| is less than 1, and the bounds of utility guarantee for
PrivTHREM becomes better than PrivTHR.
Section 7 demonstrates that by reducing the difference between
k′ and k, PrivTHR and PrivTHREM achieve more accurate results
than PrivQT, which conforms to the above analysis.
6. QUANTITATIVE MEASURES
To quantitatively assess the utility of differentially private WaveClus-
ter, we propose two types of measures for measuring the dissimi-
larity between true and differentially private WaveCluster results.
The first type, DSGC , measures the dissimilarity of the signifi-
cant grids and the clusters between true and private results. The
second type focuses on observing the usefulness of differentially
private WaveCluster results for further data analysis. The reason
is that a slight difference in the significant grids or clusters may
cause a significant difference when using the WaveCluster results.
In this paper, we choose a typical application of further data analy-
sis: building a classifier from the clustering results to predict unla-
beled data [20]. The classifier built from true WaveCluster results is
called the true classifier clft while the classifier built from differ-
entially private WaveCluster results is called the private classifier
clfp. To measure the dissimilarity between clft and clfp, we pro-
pose two metrics: OCM and 2CE.
6.1 Dissimilarity based on Significant Grids
and Clusters
DSGC considers the dissimilarities of significant grids and clus-
ters. Assume that there are t clusters of true significant grids and
s clusters of differentially private significant grids. t might not be
equal to s, and the cluster labels in t true clusters and s private clus-
ters are completely arbitrary. To accommodate these differences,
we adopt the Hungarian method [27], a combinatorial optimization
algorithm, to solve the matching problem between t true clusters
and s private clusters while minimizing the matching difference.
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Figure 4: Illustration of datasets and their WaveCluster results.
When cluster Ci matches to cluster Cj , we define that the dis-
tance d between clusterCi and clusterCj ismax{|Ci\Cj |, |Cj\Ci|}.
Consider a clusterCi = {g1, g3, g5} and a clusterCj = {g1, g5, g7, g9}.
The distance d between clustersCi andCj ismax{|{g3}|, |{g7, g9}|}
= 2. Given t true clusters, s private clusters, and t ≥ s , a match-
ing Mt,s of t true clusters and s private clusters is a set of cluster
pairs, where each private cluster is matched with a true cluster. We
then define the cost of a matching (Mcost) as the sum of all the
distances between each cluster pair in the matching Mt,s plus the
count of significant grids in the non-matched clusters:
Mcost =
∑
1≤ix≤t,1≤jy≤s
max{|Cix\Cjy |, |Cjy\Cix |}+
∑
1≤z≤t
|Cz|
Here, ix and jy indicate the subscripts of clusters in a matched
pair. |Cz| represents the count of significant grids in the non-
matched true clusters. Among all the possible matchings of clus-
ters, we use the Hungarian method to find the optimal matching
with the minimum Mcost, and computed DSGC as:
DSGC =
Mcost
|T |
Here T denotes the set of significant grids in the true WaveClus-
ter results.
6.2 Dissimilarity based on Classifier Predic-
tion
OCM and 2CE measure the dissimilarity between clft and
clfp. We name this way of evaluation as “clustering-first-then-
classification”: given a set of unlabeled data points, we use a por-
tion of the data points (e.g., 90%) to compute WaveCluster results,
where each cluster is a set of significant grids. Using the significant
grids with cluster labels as training data, we build classifiers clft
and clfp, and use them to predict the classes for the remaining data
points (e.g., 10%).
Dissimilarity of Classifiers based on Optimal Class Matching
(OCM ). OCM measures the dissimilarity between the two sets of
classes predicted by clft and clfp for the same test samples. We
use Lt to denote the set of classes predicted by clft and Lp to
denote the set of classes predicted by clfp. Since Lt and Lp are
completely arbitrary, we exploit the Hungarian method to find the
optimal matching between Lt and Lp.
Assume that a class Lt,i predicted by clft is matched to a class
Lp,j predicted by clfp, forming a class pair. We compute the count
of common test samples in the class Lt,i and the class Lp,j , and
sum the common test samples in each class pair to compute CT :
CT =
∑
1≤i≤c1,1≤j≤c2
|Lt,i ∩ Lp,j |
Here c1 is the count of classes in Lt and c2 is the count of classes
in Lp, and we assume c1 ≥ c2. Since there are many possible map-
pings from the classes in Lt to the classes in Lp, we use the Hun-
garian method to find the optimal mapping that maximizes CT .
Based on CT and the total count of the test samples TT , we derive
the dissimilarity OCM :
OCM = 1− CT
TT
When the dissimilarity is smaller, the differentially private WaveClus-
ter results are more similar to the true WaveCluster results and
maintain high utility for classification use.
Dissimilarity of Classifiers based on 2-Combination Enumer-
ation (2CE). 2CE measures the dissimilarity between clft and
clfp based on relationships of every pair of test samples, i.e., whether
two samples are in the same class. Essentially, given a pair of
test samples A and B, we say A and B are classified consistently
either (1) clft(A) = clft(B) and clfp(A) = clfp(B) or (2)
clft(A) 6= clft(B) and clfp(A) 6= clfp(B). 2CE is the ratio
of the count of test sample pairs that are not classified consistently
over the total number of test sample pairs, which is the set of 2-
combination of the test samples. 2CE uses pairs of test samples
to eliminate the need of finding the optimal matching between the
classes predicted by clft and clfp.
7. EXPERIMENTS
We evaluate the proposed techniques using three datasets that are
widely used in previous clustering algorithms [1], and one large
scale dataset derived from the check-in information in Gowalla3
geo-social networking website [9], which was used to evaluate grid-
based clustering algorithms in [37].
7.1 Experiment Setup
In our experiments, we compare the performances of the four
techniques, Baseline, PrivQT, PrivTHR, and PrivTHREM , on the
four datasets using two types of measures proposed in Section 6
and provide analysis on the results. We use Haar transform as the
wavelet transform and set the wavelet decomposition level to 1 for
the four techniques. Baseline uses the adaptive-grid method [33]
for synthetic data generation. The classification algorithm used for
measuring OCM and 2CE is C4.5 decision tree algorithm [34].
We conduct experiments with privacy budgets ranging from 0.1 to
2.0; for each budget and each metric, we apply the techniques on
each dataset for 10 times and compute their average performances.
All experiments were conducted on a machine with Intel 2.67GHz
CPU and 8GB RAM.
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/loc-gowalla.html.
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Figure 5: Comparing private k′ of 4 techniques with true k on DS1, DS2, DS3 and Gowalla with increasing .
Datasets. The four clustering datasets contain different data
shapes that are specially interesting for clustering. Figures 4 shows
the WaveCluster results on four datasets under certain parameter
settings of grid size g and density threshold p. Any two adjacent
clusters are marked with different colors. The points in red color
are identified as noise, which fall into the non-significant grids.
DS1 is a dataset containing 15 Gaussian clusters with differ-
ent degrees of cluster overlapping. It contains 30000 data points.
These 15 clusters are all in convex shapes. The center area of each
cluster has higher density and is resistant to noise. However, the
overlapped area of two adjacent clusters has lower density and is
prone to be affected by noise, which might turn the corresponding
non-significant grids into significant grids and further connect two
separate clusters. DS2 is a dataset with 3 spiral clusters. It contains
31200 data points. The head of each spiral is quite close to one an-
other. Some noisy significant grids are very likely to bridge the gap
between adjacent spirals and merge them into one cluster. DS3 is
a data dataset with 5 various shapes of clusters, including concave
shapes. It contains 31520 data points. There are two clusters that
both contain two sub components and a narrow line-shape area that
bridges those two sub components. The narrow bridging area has
low density and might be turned into non-significant grids, causing
a cluster to split into two clusters. Gowalla is the check-in dataset
resembling the world map, which records time and location infor-
mation of users’ check-ins. We use only the location information
for evaluation. There are about 6.4M records in total. The large
size of the dataset makes it infeasible to run experiments with C4.5
and Baseline due to memory constraints. Thus, similar to [33], we
sampled 1M records from the dataset for evaluation.
We next present the results on comparing k′ and k, and then
present the results of the two types of measures.
7.2 Comparing Private k′ With True k
We first measure the differences between the true k and private
k′s on each dataset with  ranging from 0.1 to 2.0, and the re-
sults are shown in Figure 5. The results show that for all datasets,
when  ≥ 0.5, the relative errors of k′, i.e., |k′−k|
k
, in PrivQT and
PrivTHREM are less than 4.7% on average, while the relative er-
rors of k′ in Baseline and PrivQT range from 32.2% to 150.5%.
For example, in DS2, the true k is 144. When  is 1, the av-
erage private k′ is 141.0 (2.1%) for PrivTHR and 142.8 (0.8%)
for PrivTHREM , while Baseline and PrivQT obtain 284.0 (97.2%)
and 249.2 (73.1%) for the average k′ respectively. Note that |Z|
is 241 in DS2, and the difference between the average k′ and k
is 105.2 for PrivQT, which is quite close to the theoretical bound
(1 − p) |Z|
2
= 108.45 derived from our utility analysis in Section
5.2.1. When  is 0.1, the k′ in PrivTHREM deviates from k more
significantly than the k′ in PrivTHR, indicating that PrivTHREM is
more sensitive to  than PrivTHR as discussed in Section 5.2.3. For
example, in DS2, the average k′ in PrivTHREM is 82.8 (42.5%)
while the average k′ in PrivTHR is 131.2 (8.9%).
7.3 Results of DSGC
Figure 6 shows the results of DSGC for the four techniques
when the privacy budget ranges from 0.1 to 2.0. X-axis shows the
privacy budgets, and Y-axis denotes the values of DSGC . As
shown in the results, both PrivTHR and PrivTHREM achieve smaller
DSGC values than Baseline and PrivQT on all four datasets for all
budgets. The reason is that though the noisy significant grids gen-
erated by Baseline and PrivQT may be similar to the true significant
grids, these noisy significant grids result in very different shapes of
clusters and thus result in a large value of DSGC , while PrivTHR
and PrivTHREM preserves more accurate cluster shapes. For ex-
ample, in DS3, the narrow line-shape areas and the gap between
two adjacent clusters are sensitive to noise. If some noisy signifi-
cant grids appear in these areas, two clusters may be merged into
one; if some significant grids disappear due to noise, one cluster
might be split into two clusters. Such changes cause DSGC to
increase significantly.
Unlike the other techniques, PrivQT benefits little from the in-
creased privacy budgets. For PrivQT, the difference between k′ and
k in PrivQT is dominated by |Z|
2
. Increasing privacy budgets can
only reduce noise magnitude and cannot smooth such difference.
Comparison to F-Measure Results. Clustering analysis usu-
ally uses F-measure as a representative external validations to mea-
sure the similarity between the ground truth (known class labels)
and the clustering results [2]. In our experiments, we consider the
true WaveCluster results as the ground truth, and the results of F-
measure are shown in Figure 7. The results show that PrivQT and
Baseline achieve high F-measure scores (more than 0.8) for almost
all budgets in DS1, even though the private results produced by
PrivQT and Baseline are quite different from the true results. For
example, when  = 0.1, the private results of PrivQT and Base-
line have more than 30 clusters while the true results have only
15 clusters. On the contrary, Figure 6 (a) shows that DSGC is
able to clearly differentiate the performances of the four techniques.
The reason is that unlike DSGC that allows only one-to-one map-
ping between true and private clusters, F-measure allows one-to-
many or many-to-one mapping between true and private clusters.
If the size of true clusters is larger than that of private clusters,
F-measure allows many to one mapping, and vice versa. Thus,
DSGC presents more strict evaluation than F-measure in comput-
ing similarity/dissimilarity.
7.4 Results of OCM and 2CE
Results of OCM . Figure 8 shows the results of OCM for the
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Figure 6: Comparing DSGC of 4 techniques on DS1, DS2, DS3 and Gowalla with increasing .
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Figure 7: Comparing F-Measure of 4 techniques on DS1, DS2, DS3 and Gowalla with increasing .
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Figure 8: Comparing OCM and 2CE of 4 techniques on DS1, DS2, DS3 and Gowalla with increasing .
four techniques. X-axis denotes the privacy budgets while Y-axis
denotes the values of OCM . As shown in the results, PrivTHR
and PrivTHREM achieve smaller OCM values than Baseline and
PrivQT for all datasets when  ranges from 0.5 to 2.0. When  is
greater than 0.5, the OCM values of PrivTHR and PrivTHREM are
less than 0.15 on DS1, DS3, and Gowalla, indicating the private
classifier clfp maintains highly similar prediction results as the true
classifier clft. On DS2 that contains 3 spirals, PrivTHREM still
maintains a very low OCM value (< 0.1) when  is greater than
0.5 while PrivTHR has a slightly worse OCM value (ranging from
0.1 to 0.2). Such results show that PrivTHREM is more resilient to
noise for concave-shaped data than PrivTHR.
Results of 2CE. Figure 8 shows the results of 2CE for the
four techniques. X-axis denotes the privacy budgets while Y-axis
denotes the values of 2CE. As shown in the results, PrivTHR and
PrivTHREM achieve smaller 2CE values than Baseline and PrivQT
for all datasets when  ranges from 0.5 to 2.0.
In general, all four techniques exhibit similar trends of 2CE as
their trends in OCM . On DS1, all four techniques have very low
2CE values (< 0.1) though their corresponding OCM values are
much higher (ranging from 0.05 to 0.5). The reason is that 2CE
captures the relationships between data points whileOCM focuses
on the mappings of classes. If there are k test samples out ofN total
samples having different prediction results in the true and private
results, 2CE expresses the differences as C(k, 2) + k(N − k)
over the total combinations of test samples C(N, 2), while OCM
expresses the differences as k over N . On DS1, the k test samples
are predicted to be in the same cluster in the private results and
C(k, 2) becomes close to 0. In this case, only k(N − k) matters in
the computation of 2CE. Given that C(N, 2) is much larger than
N and k(N − k) when N of DS1 is about 30,000, 2CE has a
smaller value than OCM for measuring the differences, and thus
is less sensitive to the noise on DS1.
Budget Allocation for PrivTHR. Based on the utility analysis
Section 5.2.2, 1 for private quantization affects the accuracy of γ,
and 2 for obtaining |Z|′ affects the accuracy of β. As the constant
factor of γ, 8
1
ln ( 4(|L|+|Z|)
ω
), is larger than the constant factor of
β, 2
2
ln ( 1
ω
), more budget should be allocated for 1 to achieve
better utility. We evaluate the values ofDSGC of PrivTHR onDS1
under different budget allocation strategies, ranging from 1% for 1
to 99% for 1. Based on the results, the budget allocation strategy
with 90% for 1 and 10% for 2 performs the best. The results of
other measures on DS1 show the similar results, and the results
of all the two types of measures on other datasets also show the
similar results. Detailed results are omitted.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have addressed the problem of cluster analysis
with differential privacy. We take a well-known effective and effi-
cient clusteing algorithm called WaveCluster, and propose several
ways to introduce randomness in the computation of WaveCluster.
We also devise several new quantitative measures for examining
the dissimilarity between the non-private and differentially private
results and the usefulness of differentially private results in classi-
fication. In the future, we will investigate under differential privacy
other categories of clustering algorithms, such as hierarchical clus-
tering. Another important problem is to explore the applicability
of differentially private clustering in those cases where the users do
not have good knowledge about the dataset, and the parameters of
the algorithms should be inferred in a differentially private way.
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